SYS // TAIWAN STRAIT WARNING BOARD
Taiwan Dashboard Clock
A minutes-to-midnight board on Gregory J. Moore's “Xi Jinping's Taiwan Dashboard” (Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Spring 2025), plus an indications and warning layer.
Scores as of Sept 28, 2026Rescored weeklyOpen sources
35 min to midnight
Beijing's motive to move early has faded since Moore wrote. Warming relations with Washington, a frozen US arms package, a purged high command and a plausible KMT comeback all give Xi reasons to wait. The one dial pointing harder at 'now' is the US munitions drain from the Iran war. Observable preparation stays low. Midnight on this clock is a PLA invasion or a blockade enforced by fire.
- 7 of 13 dials say act sooner
- 5 wait, 1 neutral
- Moore, Apr 2025: 11 of 13
- First logged reading
- Motive S
- 0.52
- Preparation T
- 0.33
SEC_01 // MOTIVE
The 13 dials
Each needle shows whether today's conditions push Beijing to act sooner (right, coral) or give it reason to wait (left, cyan). Moore's 2025 call is tagged so you can see where the reading has flipped.
Opening windows · Moore: time favors Beijing
-
DIAL 01
PLA preparedness
The January 2026 investigations of CMC Vice Chair Zhang Youxia and Joint Staff chief Liu Zhenli removed the PLA's senior operational commanders; Xi has now purged five of the six CMC members he picked in 2022. The 2026 ODNI threat assessment says Beijing has no fixed timetable and sees an amphibious assault as highly risky. More reason to wait than Moore saw.
-
DIAL 02
China's struggling economy
Q2 2026 GDP grew 4.3%, the weakest quarter since late 2022, with fixed-asset investment down 5.7% in the first half. Exports are strong (+17.6% H1) and the GDP deflator turned positive for the first time in 12 quarters. Weak, but not in crisis: still a mild reason for caution.
Closing windows · Moore: sooner is better
-
DIAL 03
Taiwan's identity drifting from the mainland
NCCU's December 2025 survey: 62.0% Taiwanese only, 2.5% Chinese only, 31.7% both. The drift Moore described has plateaued since the 2020 peak of 64.3%. Still a closing window, but it is not accelerating.
-
DIAL 04
China's demographic decline
Births fell 17% to 7.92 million in 2025, the lowest since 1949; population fell 3.39 million, a fourth straight year of decline. The trend is steeper than Moore assumed, though as he notes it bites on a 7 to 20 year horizon, not the next two.
-
DIAL 05
Importance of Taiwan's chip industry
TSMC Arizona's second fab targets 3nm volume production in 2H 2027, and TSMC says about 30% of its 2nm-and-below capacity will eventually sit in the US. Taiwan remains irreplaceable today, but the diversification Moore predicted is arriving on roughly his two-to-three-year schedule.
Sources -
DIAL 06
Chips' growing importance to China
Washington licensed H200 sales in January 2026, then Beijing told firms to boycott them and customs blocked imports, favoring domestic silicon. Tool and HBM chokepoints remain, so the squeeze is real, but US loosening and China's self-reliance push both reduce the pull toward seizing TSMC.
-
DIAL 07
Growing US commitment to Taiwan
An $11B package was approved in December 2025, but a $14B package has been frozen since the May Beijing summit, and Trump has called arms sales 'a very good negotiating chip.' Under Moore's logic, a commitment that is not deepening removes the urgency: waiting may win Beijing more concessions. This dial has flipped.
-
DIAL 08
US-Taiwan exercises and interoperability
The FY26 NDAA authorizes $1B for the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative, a Taiwan-contingency interoperability study and Coast Guard training; Taiwanese marines reportedly trained on Guam. The RIMPAC invitation was cut. Integration is growing slowly, so the gap Moore flagged is still open but narrowing.
-
DIAL 09
China's anti-ship and hypersonic edge
The 2026 Iran war reportedly consumed up to three-fifths of US Patriot stocks, up to half of THAAD stocks and around 1,000 Tomahawks; some officials assess the US could not fully execute Taiwan contingency plans near-term. China's relative missile advantage is wider now than when Moore wrote. Replenishment will take years.
-
DIAL 10
US hypersonic weapons and defenses
The first Dark Eagle battery began receiving operational missiles in spring 2026, though DOT&E says effectiveness data is insufficient. The Glide Phase Interceptor is unlikely before about 2035. The offensive gap is starting to close; the defensive gap is not.
-
DIAL 11
State of US-China relations
Relations have warmed: a Beijing summit in May, Xi's Washington state visit Sept 23-25, a trade truce under extension, and two more meetings planned at APEC and G20. Moore's dial says good relations raise the cost of going. This dial has flipped hard since 2025.
Sources -
DIAL 12
Xi's view of US intentions
The 'containment, encirclement and suppression' framing of 2023 has given way to a transactional channel where Taiwan arms sales are discussed at every summit. Beijing still presses Washington to oppose independence, but it likely sees less US hostility and more room to get what it wants without force.
-
DIAL 13
Taiwan politics under a DPP government
Lai and the DPP govern until 2028, but the KMT under Cheng Li-wun embraces the 1992 Consensus, has met Xi, and won every 2025 recall vote. Lai's approval is near even. A plausible KMT path in 2028 gives Beijing a political option Moore did not see. Watch the Nov 28 local elections.
Sources
SEC_02 // CONSTANTS
Four constants
Moore treats these as fixed pressures, not dials. They are tracked for changes in strength only and do not move the clock.
-
active
A 'sacred commitment' to Taiwan
Unchanged. Beijing's readouts from both 2026 summits frame Taiwan as central to national reunification and territorial integrity.
Sources -
strengthened
Authoritarian decision-making risk
The 2026 purges (38 full generals investigated or missing) leave fewer officers able to give Xi candid readiness assessments. This cuts both ways: less capability, more risk of miscalculation.
Sources -
active
Xi's political incentive
The 21st Party Congress in fall 2027 decides a fourth term. Taiwan remains the legacy prize, though summit diplomacy now offers Xi visible wins without war.
-
weakened
PLA readiness goal for 2027
The 2027 goal still stands as a capability marker, but the 2026 ODNI assessment sees no fixed timetable and analysts judge the purges put the goal out of reach.
SEC_03 // PREPARATION
Indications and warning
Moore's dials read motive. This layer reads observable preparation, the things a warning analyst would expect to see before a campaign. Levels run from none through watch and elevated to warning.
-
PLA air and naval pressure
Level 1 of 3: Watch
PLA aircraft in Taiwan's ADIZ fell 52% (Jan 1 to Aug 9, 2026 vs 2025), the lowest since 2022, while warship presence stayed steady. Daily activity continues at a lower, more selective tempo.
Sources -
Large-scale drills around Taiwan
Level 1 of 3: Watch
Justice Mission 2025 (Dec 29-30) rehearsed a full blockade over the largest area yet. No large-scale drill was staged in the first half of 2026, the first such gap since 2022.
Sources -
Amphibious lift and sealift
Level 1 of 3: Watch
Capability build-out continues: Shuiqiao landing barges, the Type 076, and 76 dual-use ro-ro ferries built 2023-2026 that rehearse with the PLA. No reporting of ferries being pulled from commercial service or massing at embarkation ports.
Sources -
Strategic stockpiling
Level 2 of 3: Elevated
China holds roughly 1.2 billion barrels of crude and the EIA expected about 1M bpd more stockpiling in 2026, plus record grain reserves. Analysts call this a strategic warning indicator, though the Iran-war fuel crisis gives a benign explanation.
Sources -
Coast guard and gray-zone moves
Level 1 of 3: Watch
Beijing has shifted pressure from aircraft toward coast guard patrols near Taiwan, and the Guangdong MSA announced new Strait traffic control measures in August. This is the path a quarantine would take; watch for boarding or inspection of Taiwan-bound shipping.
Sources -
Domestic mobilization signals
Level 0 of 3: None
No open-source reporting found of unusual reservist call-ups, blood drives, recruitment surges, travel restrictions on PLA personnel, or advisories pulling PRC nationals out of Taiwan or allied countries.
-
Rhetoric and legal groundwork
Level 1 of 3: Watch
Beijing's summit readouts press Washington to oppose Taiwan independence. No new legal instruments or Anti-Secession Law invocations tied to Taiwan this quarter.
Sources
SEC_04 // LOG
Reading log
Each weekly review adds one line. Moore's original reading is kept as the reference point.
| Date | Minutes | Dials saying sooner | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-28 | 35 | 7 of 13 | Baseline. Relations warmed after two summits; arms package frozen; PLA leadership purged; US munitions depleted by the Iran war. |
| 2025-04-21 | n/a | 11 of 13 | Moore's published reading. He judged an invasion likely within one to three years. |
SEC_05 // CALENDAR
Dates that could move a dial
- Nov 2026APEC in China, a planned Trump-Xi meeting
- Nov 28, 2026Taiwan local elections, first test for the Cheng-led KMT
- Dec 2026G20 Miami, a planned Trump-Xi meeting
- Late Dec 2026Window for a year-end drill like Justice Mission 2025
- 2H 2027TSMC Arizona fab 2 begins 3nm volume production
- Summer 2027Beidaihe leadership retreat
- Fall 202721st Party Congress; PLA centenary goal year
- Jan 2028Taiwan presidential election
SEC_06 // METHOD
How the clock is set
Each dial is scored from −2 (strong reason to wait) to +2 (strong reason to act soon). Each indications and warning (I&W) indicator is scored 0 to 3. Dials are weighted equally, as in Moore.
S = (mean dial reading + 2) / 4motive, 0 to 1T = mean I&W level / 3preparation, 0 to 1minutes = round(60 − 30·S − 28·T)clamped to 2 to 60if any I&W level is 3: minutes ≤ 10
Motive alone can take the clock to 30 minutes. Getting inside that takes preparation you can see. The split is deliberate: Moore's own reading in 2025 had 11 of 13 dials favoring action, and nothing happened, because motive is not intent.
Midnight: The PLA begins a major use of force against Taiwan: an invasion, or a blockade enforced by fire.
This is a structured judgment aid, not a forecast. Scores are analyst calls on open sources, re-read weekly and cited on each card.
Framework: Gregory J. Moore, “Xi Jinping's Taiwan Dashboard,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Spring 2025. Scores refreshed weekly by Claude from open sources.